Context

Information stealer (or infostealer) is a malware family designed to gather and exfiltrate sensitive information from the infected host. This threat became widespread over the past few years, and is increasingly distributed by multiple threat actors from the cybercrime ecosystem. The distribution methods used to spread stealers are varied, ranging from malspam to fake installers. As observed by SEKOIA.IO, most infection chains leverage social engineering techniques to lure victims into downloading and executing the malicious payloads.

A common scheme to trick the victim is a tutorial that demonstrates how to install a cracked software, which turns out to be an information stealer. For the distribution method, the victim enters a malicious website either promoted through a Google Ad, or SEO poisoned (Search Engine Optimization), or shared in a legitimate community space. To assist the victim in compromising its system, the tutorial often describes step-by-step how to disable the antivirus software, download the fake installer and run it.

SEKOIA.IO analysts unveiled a large and resilient infrastructure used to distribute Raccoon and Vidar stealers, likely since early 2020. The associated infection chain, leveraging this infrastructure of over 250 domains, uses about a hundred of fake cracked software catalogue websites that redirect to several links before downloading the payload hosted on file share platforms, such as GitHub.

This blogpost aims at presenting the current infection chain, payloads and the whole infrastructure tracked by SEKOIA.IO. We will contact the services abused by the intrusion set to forward the domain names and accounts used for malicious activities. 

Infection chain leveraging fake cracked software

This part details the steps of an observed infection chain leveraging fake cracked software to distribute Raccoon and Vidar stealers. Following parts describe the final payloads distributed by the intrusion set, and unveil each stage of the infrastructure and how to track it.

This report focuses on one cluster that shares similarities on redirect links, domain registrar and final payload hosting.

At the time of writing it is not clear to whom this infrastructure could be associated to. SEKOIA.IO analysts assess it is plausible this infrastructure is operated by a threat actor running a Traffic Distribution System (TDS), whose clients pay for the service to distribute their stealer builds. It is also likely this infrastructure is operated by an intrusion set distributing its own stealer builds.

Regardless, SEKOIA.IO analysts assess this cluster is almost certainly operated by a single intrusion set.

The infection consists in the following steps:

Step 1 – Search engine displaying SEO poisoned websites

A basic search to find cracked software yields several malicious websites, as shown below.

Searching for Adobe Photoshop paid software, a user is served the following SEO-poisoned webpage: “hxxps://crackist[.]com/adobe-photoshop-free/”.

This webpage contains information on the legitimate Adobe Photoshop software, increasing the capability to gain the trust of potential victims. It also contains dozens of URLs redirecting to other pages of this website, as well as to the legitimate Adobe website or other platforms, including YouTube. This contributes to improving the website indexing in search engines (SEO poisoning technique).

The content of the webpages ends with a tutorial demonstrating how to install the cracked version of the software, and several download buttons redirecting the user to step 2.

Step 2 – Redirection links disguising the malicious payload

Once the user clicks one of the download buttons, a new window opens in its browser and several HTTP/HTTPS communications follow until another webpage appears with further instructions.

The URL redirection chain is as described below. It is worth noting that looking at the URLs’ pattern allows us to track all other related domains (see part “Tracking the whole infrastructure”).

1. A first URL containing several query parameters, including the title of the previous webpage, whose exact path is “/”:
   hxxps://primrvils[.]click/?open=df3c9be1966401335aa7bec56362&d=1&x=183&close=f66f157fc6afa&p=Adobe%20Photoshop%20Crack%202022%20V23.1.1.202%20Full%20Version
   
2. A second similar URL with other query fields, whose exact path is, again “/”:
   hxxp://162.243.164[.]175/?63a07a011f989=544d893fa927d23b4e6d0f0615d422be&63a07a011f992=183&63a07a011f994=1_adobe-photoshop-crack-2022-v23-1-1-202-full-version&gkss=178522&63a07a011f998=1
   
3. A third URL on another domain name:
   hxxps://offsebike[.]cyou/?5da11e4c71470ca6198ad7c9a0ed05dd=83b9a10f0c2629348a2e3ef5e913400ea3e97b40&med=119801&src=63a07a02550ed
   
4. A fourth URL using href[.]li, which is an internal referral redirect:
   hxxps://href[.]li/?hxxps://offsebike[.]cyou/?sandy=6518ca1b440a9f0afd64581b41f2fee10f9eaff6&63a07a064bd0e=605e5d3bbc94d53abe30c84684fe15cc
   
5. The final URL from this redirection chain:
   hxxps://offsebike[.]cyou/?sandy=6518ca1b440a9f0afd64581b41f2fee10f9eaff6&63a07a064bd0e=605e5d3bbc94d53abe30c84684fe15cc

At this stage, the last URL displays a webpage containing instructions, a Cuttly shortened link (hxxps://cutt[.]ly/u0PdXuo) and a password. The shortened URL is not clickable, as the HTML code storing the link uses the class “form_class”, which is normally intended to submit data.

SEKOIA.IO assess the whole redirection chain is likely used to harden the analysis, avoid detection and make the infrastructure stealth, for the following reasons:

• Using several redirections complicates automated analysis by security solutions, and can be used to filter webclients based on their HTTP fingerprint and geolocation;
• Getting the malicious payloads requires much hopping, and a human action. These hops hinder automatic collection of the payloads from the SEO-poisoned website;
• Carving the infrastructure as such is almost certainly designed to ensure resilience, making it easier and quicker to update or change a step, for instance in the case of a temporary malfunction or dismantlement of part of this infrastructure. Additionally, we observed that each stage has multiple instances (domains, or IP addresses) that change regularly.

Moreover, creating additional steps between the initial webpage and the malicious payload allows the operator to maintain a good reputation in the website leveraging SEO poisoning, and prevent its infrastructure from being discovered.

Step 3 – Final payload hosted on GitHub

Browsing the Cuttly redirects the user to the download page of an archive, hosted on the legitimate file sharing platform GitHub:
hxxps://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/davids1a/soulmate/main/NewInstaller_1234_FullVersion_B4.rar

The victim downloads it, decompresses the archive with the password “1234” (or “2022” in more recent infection chains) and executes the PE file, named “Setup.exe” in most cases. In the analysed infection chain, the payload embeds Raccoon Stealer.

Based on the pattern used by the intrusion set to name the archive hosted on GitHub, SEKOIA.IO analysts were able to find a dozen of accounts used to store the malicious payloads.

Malware distributed by this stealth infrastructure

SEKOIA.IO collected over 120 samples distributed by this infection chain, which all correspond to samples of Raccoon or Vidar stealer, from 6 unique botnets. Most of the password-protected archives are hosted on GitHub, on over a dozen accounts.

GitHub accounts abused to host malicious payloads

All downloaded files are RAR archives and share similarities in their naming convention, which includes:

• Password “1234” (or “2022” more recently) in the file name;
• Keywords, such as Application, Complete, File, Release, Version;
• Underscores between keywords and passwords;
• Random alphanumeric characters, often put at the end of the file name, as a unique identifier;
• Upper case letter at the beginning of words.

Here are some examples of password-protected archive file names:

hxxps://github[.]com/ppsinstall
hxxps://github[.]com/Mughalshughal (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/Jonybba (banned at time of writing) hxxps://github[.]com/GoldenMa-Re
hxxps://github[.]com/dljack
hxxps://github[.]com/Hashmi1211
hxxps://github[.]com/davids1a
hxxps://github[.]com/mega1211
hxxps://github[.]com/moonh1211 (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/shoby149 (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/dodlosi
hxxps://github[.]com/megajackson
hxxps://github[.]com/chillqueem
hxxps://github[.]com/maxiwel123
hxxps://github[.]com/gilisoftt (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/primaryy1 (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/moonshon (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/msdon1211
hxxps://github[.]com/max1t7 (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/leojack1211 (banned at time of writing)
hxxps://github[.]com/naomibrown178 (banned at time of writing)

More than a hundred files were committed on these accounts between 24, November and 20, December, 2022, as shown in the following figure.

Payload analysis

We collected and analysed every payload still available from these accounts, as some of them were already banned by GitHub. We identified 70 samples of Vidar stealer, and 54 samples of Raccoon stealer.

As Vidar and Raccoon are infostealers sold as a Malware-as-a-Service, we could reasonably expect to identify clients of the botnet service. We therefore listed the different botnets identifiers that we were able to extract from the samples:

• Vidar: 1707, 1364 and 1839;
• Raccoon: b4f472421ce1f18efd9f610339c3dae1 and 007ada2d73f5e9d5967b69ee7ea5e489.

All this information is valuable to understand that this whole infrastructure is only used to distribute two malware families, associated with a few botnets. At this stage, it is reasonable to postulate that this activity matches the one of an intrusion set working for its own personal interest, or on behalf of a few exclusive partners – in opposition to a large Traffic Distribution System, or Pay-Per-Install service, which spread a wide range of payloads at a larger-scale, managed by multiple cybercriminals.

Most collected payloads implement Defense Evasion techniques to avoid being executed in virtual environments, such as sandbox or virtual machines, and complexify static analysis. We observed the following techniques:

• Payload packed with Themida, a commercial packer notably designed to disable a  software code source from being disassembled, e.g. https://tria.ge/221220-qs8hsshe99:
  NewstVersion_1234_InstallerPass.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: ef70efe0a3cd860831657fa7ee8d832d49c8d8489df4b35d2480cc043bbb1b04
• Payload packed with VMProtect, another commercial packer protecting code being executed on a virtual machine, e.g. https://tria.ge/221220-qvjbpahf32:
  Open_New_Pass_1234_G4_Active.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: b66d3f7fc15dce8aca5a8489ddb7135b2a49fc2e39653ae9ac8ac4f6ea815412
• Payload packed with Eziriz’s .NET Reactor, a commercial packer used to prevent reverse engineering of .NET applications, e.g. https://tria.ge/221220-qyhvbshf57:
  LatestVersion_2022_PasSWrd_Active.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: 49c4fafc75e388a656e4e29fa2e8419d54c37cd700eaf48f67de67f13314ad78
• Payload leveraging sandbox evasion by query the Registry key associated to VirtualBox “HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__”, e.g. https://tria.ge/221220-q2hzhahf75:
  Active_APpLicatiOn_1234_Vr6ty-Oz.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: aa80f09c015c63a1b140be6cc7f6e102fbac728a94e9d7063caaaede90bbf364
• Payload leveraging time based evasion by executing the base64-encoded PowerShell command line “start-sleep -seconds 20”, e.g. https://tria.ge/221220-q5fcsahf97:
  FullActive_setup_1234_New_Version.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: 77cf1211c5fbbac802da6f3acfabfcd83a94e8e0fef6f50f925ddcc7bee412db
• Payload excluding the Windows repository “C:\” of Windows Defender monitoring by executing the base64-encoded PowerShell command line “set-mppreference -exclusionpath C:\”, e.g. https://tria.ge/submit/221220-q9wwbshg49:
  PrimeSetup_1234_FullVersion_Active.rar/Setup.exe
SHA256: d5c1c64135fad708c51d88ecc889a1b50404bfd3233f01a7b5f0d26b2c718b2e

In addition to the techniques outlined above, all payloads are compressed in password-encrypted RAR archives. This technique is very common among cybercriminals distributing commodity malware, as it avoids the detection of the encrypted malicious executable. Moreover, the executables are padded with zero-bytes to reach a large size (more than 400MB), a size that is not accepted by most analysis tools.

By using the previous defense evasion techniques, the intrusion set can increase the chances of successfully compromising a target system, making antivirus detection more difficult.

Tracking this large infrastructure

In this part, we focus on the illumination of the infrastructure used for the infection chain leading to the distribution of Raccoon and Vidar payloads hosted on GitHub. As previously discussed, the infection chain uses several websites, domains and IP addresses for different stages, as detailed below.

First stage – SEO poisoned websites advertising cracked software

The domain “crackist[.]com” hosting the websites leveraging SEO-poisoning is registered with a Namecheap privacy service and resolves a shared IP address provided by Amazon (99.83.154[.]118), which makes it difficult to pivot to other domain names.

By using the DNS records, and manually checking the results, SEKOIA.IO analysts identified the following list of 46 domain names, hosting cracked software websites:

allactivationkey[.]com allcracker[.]com audioplugins[.]net completecrack[.]com crackeyfree[.]com crackglobal[.]com crackist[.]com crackmykeys[.]com crackproduct[.]com crackregister[.]com crackservices[.]com crackwebs[.]com crackwebs[.]com crackwindow[.]com crackzero[.]com easywindowsactivator[.]com

forevercrack[.]com freewindowsactivator[.]com fullkeypro[.]com fullportable[.]com giantcrack[.]com hitpcgames[.]com latestproductkey[.]com macapps-download[.]com macdownloadpro[.]com macsoftwarepro[.]com masterforpc[.]com minicrack[.]com mocrack[.]com newactivationkey[.]com newcracksoft[.]com newlicensekeys[.]com

opcracks[.]com pandacracks[.]com plugin-torrent[.]com portabledownloads[.]com premiumcrack[.]com procracksoftware[.]com softkeygenpro[.]com softwarekeygen[.]com thecracksoftware[.]com totalcracks[.]com vst-crack[.]com vst-torrent[.]net windowsactivatorpro[.]com windowscrack[.]com

All these domains share the same JARM fingerprint, which seems to be specific to a default Cloudflare certificate. By correlating the JARM with the registrar, and again manually checking the results, we retrieved the 82 following domain names:

allcracker[.]comallsoftwarepro[.]com crack-line[.]com crack-warez[.]com crack-win[.]com crackask[.]com crackcow[.]com crackedfilez[.]com cracker01[.]com crackexe[.]net crackfaqs[.]com crackinges[.]com cracklet[.]com crackmyapps[.]com crackname[.]com cracknkeys[.]com cracknpc[.]com crackny[.]com crackpcpro[.]com crackre[.]com crackrepack[.]com cracks-full[.]com cracks11[.]com cracksbuddy[.]com cracksfree[.]net crackspromax[.]com cracksroom[.]com crackstores[.]com

cracktera[.]comcrackzsoft[.]com crackzsoft[.]me dailycracks[.]com dll-crack[.]com dllcrackz[.]com fitcrack[.]com free-crack[.]com full-crack[.]com full-cracked[.]com full-softwares[.]com fullcrackapp[.]com fullcrackfile[.]com hdstreamzforpcdl[.]com hitcrackspc[.]com icrackpro[.]com icracx[.]com inshotforpc[.]com keygen4u[.]com keygenguru[.]net license4softs[.]com macgamers[.]net nomanpc[.]com onecracks[.]com opcracks[.]com ovacrack[.]com patchzip[.]com pccrackspro[.]com

procrackapp[.]comprocracklink[.]com procracksfile[.]com samdownloads[.]net sharemeforpc[.]com softs32[.]com softskeygen[.]com tekken3forpc[.]com thecrackfiles[.]com thepccrack[.]com tocracks[.]com totalcracks[.]com trycracks[.]com unacademyforpc[.]com uploadpk[.]com uploadproper[.]net urcracks[.]net uscracks[.]com vysorforpc[.]com wecracks[.]com windowspatch[.]com wowcracks[.]com ycracks[.]com yourcracks[.]com

Although used templates differ between each website, most of them do embed download buttons redirecting to the second stage of our infrastructure.

Among theses websites we notably identified “inshotforpc[.]com” a website dedicated to the “InShot” software, also redirecting the user to the same infrastructure, using a tutorial and download buttons. Using the DNS records, we pivoted on other similar domain names.

dikshaappforpc[.]com hdstreamzforpcdl[.]com inshotforpc[.]com kinemasterforpcdl[.]com masterforpc[.]com

mobilelegendsforpc[.]com sharemeforpc[.]com tekken3forpc[.]com unacademyforpc[.]com vysorforpc[.]com

Second stage – Redirect URLs containing the website title

Based on the identified websites, we retrieved second stage URLs, including:
hxxp://iglo0host[.]click/?z=2237&n=$TITLE
hxxp://mikavika[.]click/?z=2938&f=3&n=$TITLE
hxxps://myhasrnga[.]xyz/?z=1618&n=$TITLE
hxxps://pingatinga[.]click/?it=12ec3f5c1fbe4c278&d=1&x=112&do=550b7d3b6&p=$TITLE
hxxps://primrvils[.]click/?open=4d6eb9c6b47&d=1&x=183&close=fc476d220f&p=$TITLE
hxxps://top3hostngc[.]xyz/?d=1&s=2739&q=$TITLE
These URLs are stage 1 of the redirection chain. They share common patterns that can be used to find more domains. Here are some characteristics:

• TLD is either .click, .xyz or .cfd;
• Exact path of the URLs is “/”;
• Query fields are associations of two or more keywords, such as “z”/“n” or “open”/“d”/”x”/”close”.

By using indigestible regular expressions on URL scanning platforms, we found the following list of 108 domain names, extracted from the URLs. As the URL contains a webpage title related to a cracked software, SEKOIA.IO analysts associate these results to the same activity with high confidence.

We used the following query on urlscan[.]io.

aboxwithfilez[.]xyz asperhost[.]xyz azilominehostz[.]xyz bdomicfilez[.]xyz binaryfile[.]cfd bitloservx[.]click blakbooot[.]click bnr45iqly[.]cfd bokywodzfa[.]xyz bottlecap1[.]click brownrabr[.]click bubl-filez[.]xyz ceedohostzcomi[.]xyz chondimahiy[.]xyz cl0nytig[.]xyz corokeralama[.]xyz corpyfoxiy[.]xyz crookhost[.]cfd crop18king[.]xyz ditlivhostz[.]xyz eros0hostz[.]xyz eroxyhost[.]xyz evosurver[.]click fiiezofcloude[.]xyz find2sitrox[.]xyz fishsurver[.]click fizzzhost[.]xyz freefiles22[.]xyz gooddata[.]xyz greenbottz[.]xyz heifan2survr[.]xyz hersiz00d[.]xyz hft76yu[.]cfd hificellfon[.]click hy3srver[.]xyz hyphnhostn[.]xyz

iee2kolmoz[.]xyz iglo0host[.]click itforhost[.]xyz kihygenvc[.]xyz kinbo112[.]xyz king-host[.]xyz kitefly[.]xyz kitlybitli44[.]xyz klimyteioz2b[.]xyz koptikbaj4[.]xyz krimikomrew4[.]xyz lowfeedo1[.]xyz loyabonzy[.]xyz lvihostng[.]click massraphost[.]xyz mattservrz[.]xyz mikavika[.]click minghost[.]cfd mo21srver[.]xyz moyakanj0[.]xyz myclotb0e[.]xyz myhasrnga[.]xyz myloster2v1[.]xyz mypklboy3[.]xyz mysite-servrz[.]xyz mytallphon[.]click naswarlobi[.]xyz neonhost[.]click nikuserver[.]xyz nysicforma[.]xyz odibolngup[.]click ooxyzhost[.]xyz opetafruith[.]xyz osr1file[.]xyz pepatoniyac[.]click pingatinga[.]click

pinkbotts2[.]xyz pozitfiiezi[.]xyz primrvils[.]click purplbogi[.]click purplebot21[.]xyz qcellphone[.]click qoli-filez[.]xyz quy32-filez[.]xyz ridsosurver1[.]xyz rizonfoggy[.]xyz roizohozt19[.]xyz safehand[.]xyz setserverfile[.]xyz sid4time[.]xyz sigrat4hyp[.]xyz singlwirre[.]click sitka-pyrok[.]xyz sixcozrevoli[.]xyz slom0wise4[.]xyz slugmefilehos[.]xyz surbexdillx[.]xyz survrhostngs[.]xyz tolby-file[.]xyz toloserverz[.]click top3hostngc[.]xyz trollhost[.]xyz urconsolest[.]click urhandups[.]xyz urstolupzo[.]xyz vig0boat[.]click ww16[.]ping-host[.]xyz ww16[.]tolby-file[.]xyz ww25[.]qoli-filez[.]xyz ww38[.]tolby-file[.]xyz xo-xohost[.]xyz yellokomput[.]xyz

Third stage – Redirect URLs containing IP address

URLs of the third stage are only redirect URLs between stage 2 and stage 4. The method for stage 2 is applicable to stage 3. Here is the list of links used for this stage:

hxxp://157.230.87[.]146/?639d9e9b635aa=74b9487b6e942ed6a2bcbdfe0ac54f51&639d9e9b635b4=2938&639d9e9b635b5=$TITLE&dfgdfg=169134&639d9e9b635b6=3
hxxp://157.230.87[.]146/?639da05c274d8=df482a952ba365c515ca367f56ad72e5&639da05c274e1=2237&639da05c274e3=$TITLE&gkss=609427
hxxp://157.230.87[.]146/?639da2cb59b39=ad790e90651d6c4e835e1790cab8f32a&639da2cb59b57=2337&639da2cb59b59=$TITLE&gkss=950459
hxxps://162.243.164[.]175/?639d9f7a287a1=227a54a6b6fc0db3a0353afba97e1c92&639d9f7a287af=2739&639d9f7a287b0=$TITLE&gkss=87743

The characteristics shared by these URLs are:

• URLs are built from an IP address;
• Exact path of the URLs is “/”;
• All URLs contain the query field “gkss”, followed by an integer.

To find other related IP addresses, SEKOIA.IO analysts used the following query on urlscan[.]io.

By querying several URL sharing platforms, we found the following IP addresses:

IP addresses	Valid on
157.230.87[.]146	December 2022
162.243.164[.]175	December 2022
159.223.97[.]209	November 2022
143.244.212[.]228	November 2022
137.184.159[.]42	October 2022
146.190.12[.]4	October 2022
137.184.227[.]198	October 2022
137.184.43[.]153	October 2022
143.198.164[.]102	July 2022
134.122.115[.]190	January 2022
34.203.142[.]179	September 2021
44.198.126[.]45	September 2021
18.144.113[.]48	September 2021

Fourth stage – Webpages with instructions, download link and password

The stage 4 URLs display the webpage containing instructions, a download link and the password. Here is a list of links we manually collected:

hxxps://entry4hide[.]cyou/?sandy=$REDACTED&639da05ebe3e1=$REDACTED
hxxps://exitlocat[.]cyou/?a242f0edf87047a434e9b97d7f5c1b6e=$REDACTED&med=64084&src=639da2cc00c7e
hxxps://exitlocat[.]cyou/?sandy=$REDACTED&639da2d1adb62=$REDACTED
hxxps://jytibarose[.]xyz/?5a7bf36ab2a6d5859c470e6500cdc697=$REDACTED&med=121806&src=639dadb0a1639
hxxps://jytibarose[.]xyz/?sandy=$REDACTED&639dadb20b907=$REDACTED
hxxps://offsebike[.]cyou/?26be43758227d03fa58175aeb7c44ff8=$REDACTED&med=65518&src=639d9f8d23663
hxxps://offsebike[.]cyou/?sandy=$REDACTED&639d9f8ed265d=$REDACTED
hxxps://sigmarole[.]cyou/?b85e2ca0574125a3ef42b1a186dfde2e=$REDACTED&med=139248&src=639ee405f0b1a

Same method again, URLs share the following characteristics:

• TLD is either .cyou, .xyz or .click;
• Exact path of the URLs is “/”;
• URLs contain either the query field “sandy”, or “med” and “src”.

SEKOIA.IO analysts used the following query on urlscan[.]io.

Using this query on URL sharing platforms results in the 20 following domains:

bitclandng[.]click entry4hide[.]cyou exitlocat[.]cyou geclandz[.]click get4pc[.]click get4pcsoft[.]click hosngclowz[.]cyou

jytibarose[.]xyz komikata[.]click landkemoty[.]click mekaofland[.]click monitorcrack[.]click offsebike[.]cyou pccracking[.]click

pirtibox[.]click sigmarole[.]cyou tikalandof[.]click whitr0sez[.]xyz withylndng[.]click woldcup20[.]cyou

Conclusion

SEKOIA.IO illuminated a whole infostealer distribution infrastructure by pivoting on technical artefacts, such as DNS, JARM fingerprint, registrars and URLs. With these tracking methods, we were able to trace an infection chain leveraging fake cracked software back to a large and stealth infrastructure of over 250 domain names, that we assess to be almost certainly used since at least 2020.

Given the resilience of this infrastructure, the intrusion set will surely continue to leverage it in the near future to distribute the malicious payloads. It  will be interesting to follow the possible changes in the distributed malware families to track down new threats, or new trends in defense evasion techniques.

More importantly, this blogpost highlights the potential risks of downloading cracked software, a very common social engineering technique to install malware. We highly recommend only downloading and installing software from trusted, official websites. Beyond the indicators of compromise, detection teams can hunt for infection chains leveraging fake cracked software by searching for weak signals, such as communications to unusual TLD and to URLs containing IP addresses, or looking for suspicious file names.

IoCs & Technical Details

IoCs

The list of IoCs is available on SEKOIA.IO Community GitHub.

Stage 1 (Websites leveraging SEO-poisoning)

allactivationkey[.]com allcracker[.]com allsoftwarepro[.]com audioplugins[.]net completecrack[.]com crack-line[.]com crack-warez[.]com crack-win[.]com crackask[.]com crackcow[.]com crackedfilez[.]com cracker01[.]com crackexe[.]net crackeyfree[.]com crackfaqs[.]com crackglobal[.]com crackinges[.]com crackist[.]com cracklet[.]com crackmyapps[.]com crackmykeys[.]com crackname[.]com cracknkeys[.]com cracknpc[.]com crackny[.]com crackpcpro[.]com crackproduct[.]com crackre[.]com crackregister[.]com crackrepack[.]com cracks-full[.]com cracks11[.]com cracksbuddy[.]com crackservices[.]com cracksfree[.]net crackspromax[.]com cracksroom[.]com crackstores[.]com cracktera[.]com crackwebs[.]com crackwindow[.]com crackzero[.]com crackzsoft[.]com

crackzsoft[.]me dailycracks[.]com dikshaappforpc[.]com dll-crack[.]com dllcrackz[.]com easywindowsactivator[.]com fitcrack[.]com forevercrack[.]com free-crack[.]com freewindowsactivator[.]com full-crack[.]com full-cracked[.]com full-softwares[.]com fullcrackapp[.]com fullcrackfile[.]com fullkeypro[.]com fullportable[.]com giantcrack[.]com hdstreamzforpcdl[.]com hitcrackspc[.]com hitpcgames[.]com icrackpro[.]com icracx[.]com inshotforpc[.]com keygen4u[.]com keygenguru[.]net kinemasterforpcdl[.]com latestproductkey[.]com license4softs[.]com macapps-download[.]com macdownloadpro[.]com macgamers[.]net macsoftwarepro[.]com masterforpc[.]com minicrack[.]com mobilelegendsforpc[.]com mocrack[.]com newactivationkey[.]com newcracksoft[.]com newlicensekeys[.]com nomanpc[.]com onecracks[.]com opcracks[.]com

ovacrack[.]com pandacracks[.]com patchzip[.]com pccrackspro[.]com pcgamesguru[.]com pcsoftkit[.]com plugin-torrent[.]com portabledownloads[.]com premiumcrack[.]com procrackapp[.]com procracklink[.]com procracksfile[.]com procracksoftware[.]com samdownloads[.]net sharemeforpc[.]com softkeygenpro[.]com softs32[.]com softskeygen[.]com softwarekeygen[.]com tekken3forpc[.]com thecrackfiles[.]com thecracksoftware[.]com thepccrack[.]com tocracks[.]com torrdroidforpc[.]com totalcracks[.]com trycracks[.]com unacademyforpc[.]com uploadpk[.]com uploadproper[.]net urcracks[.]net uscracks[.]com vst-crack[.]com vst-torrent[.]net vysorforpc[.]com wecracks[.]com windowsactivatorpro[.]com windowscrack[.]com windowspatch[.]com wowcracks[.]com ycracks[.]com yourcracks[.]com

Stage 2 (Redirect URL containing the webpage title)

aboxwithfilez[.]xyz asperhost[.]xyz azilominehostz[.]xyz bdomicfilez[.]xyz binaryfile[.]cfd bitloservx[.]click blakbooot[.]click bnr45iqly[.]cfd bokywodzfa[.]xyz bottlecap1[.]click brownrabr[.]click bubl-filez[.]xyz ceedohostzcomi[.]xyz chondimahiy[.]xyz cl0nytig[.]xyz corokeralama[.]xyz corpyfoxiy[.]xyz crookhost[.]cfd crop18king[.]xyz ditlivhostz[.]xyz eros0hostz[.]xyz eroxyhost[.]xyz evosurver[.]click fiiezofcloude[.]xyz find2sitrox[.]xyz fishsurver[.]click fizzzhost[.]xyz freefiles22[.]xyz gooddata[.]xyz greenbottz[.]xyz heifan2survr[.]xyz hersiz00d[.]xyz hft76yu[.]cfd hificellfon[.]click hy3srver[.]xyz hyphnhostn[.]xyz

iee2kolmoz[.]xyz iglo0host[.]click itforhost[.]xyz kihygenvc[.]xyz kinbo112[.]xyz king-host[.]xyz kitefly[.]xyz kitlybitli44[.]xyz klimyteioz2b[.]xyz koptikbaj4[.]xyz krimikomrew4[.]xyz lowfeedo1[.]xyz loyabonzy[.]xyz lvihostng[.]click massraphost[.]xyz mattservrz[.]xyz mikavika[.]click minghost[.]cfd mo21srver[.]xyz moyakanj0[.]xyz myclotb0e[.]xyz myhasrnga[.]xyz myloster2v1[.]xyz mypklboy3[.]xyz mysite-servrz[.]xyz mytallphon[.]click naswarlobi[.]xyz neonhost[.]click nikuserver[.]xyz nysicforma[.]xyz odibolngup[.]click ooxyzhost[.]xyz opetafruith[.]xyz osr1file[.]xyz pepatoniyac[.]click pingatinga[.]click

pinkbotts2[.]xyz pozitfiiezi[.]xyz primrvils[.]click purplbogi[.]click purplebot21[.]xyz qcellphone[.]click qoli-filez[.]xyz quy32-filez[.]xyz ridsosurver1[.]xyz rizonfoggy[.]xyz roizohozt19[.]xyz safehand[.]xyz setserverfile[.]xyz sid4time[.]xyz sigrat4hyp[.]xyz singlwirre[.]click sitka-pyrok[.]xyz sixcozrevoli[.]xyz slom0wise4[.]xyz slugmefilehos[.]xyz surbexdillx[.]xyz survrhostngs[.]xyz tolby-file[.]xyz toloserverz[.]click top3hostngc[.]xyz trollhost[.]xyz urconsolest[.]click urhandups[.]xyz urstolupzo[.]xyz vig0boat[.]click ww16[.]ping-host[.]xyz ww16[.]tolby-file[.]xyz ww25[.]qoli-filez[.]xyz ww38[.]tolby-file[.]xyz xo-xohost[.]xyz yellokomput[.]xyz

Stage 3 (Redirect IP addresses)

IP addresses	Valid on
157.230.87[.]146	December 2022
162.243.164[.]175	December 2022
159.223.97[.]209	November 2022
143.244.212[.]228	November 2022
137.184.159[.]42	October 2022
146.190.12[.]4	October 2022
137.184.227[.]198	October 2022
137.184.43[.]153	October 2022
143.198.164[.]102	July 2022
134.122.115[.]190	January 2022
34.203.142[.]179	September 2021
44.198.126[.]45	September 2021
18.144.113[.]48	September 2021

Stage 4 (Webpages with instructions)

bitclandng[.]click entry4hide[.]cyou exitlocat[.]cyou geclandz[.]click get4pc[.]click get4pcsoft[.]click hosngclowz[.]cyou

jytibarose[.]xyz komikata[.]click landkemoty[.]click mekaofland[.]click monitorcrack[.]click offsebike[.]cyou pccracking[.]click

pirtibox[.]click sigmarole[.]cyou tikalandof[.]click whitr0sez[.]xyz withylndng[.]click woldcup20[.]cyou

GitHub account abused to host payloads

hxxps://github[.]com/ppsinstall hxxps://github[.]com/Mughalshughal hxxps://github[.]com/Jonybba hxxps://github[.]com/GoldenMa-Re hxxps://github[.]com/dljack hxxps://github[.]com/Hashmi1211 hxxps://github[.]com/davids1a hxxps://github[.]com/mega1211 hxxps://github[.]com/moonh1211 hxxps://github[.]com/shoby149 hxxps://github[.]com/dodlosi hxxps://github[.]com/megajackson hxxps://github[.]com/chillqueem hxxps://github[.]com/maxiwel123 hxxps://github[.]com/gilisoftt hxxps://github[.]com/primaryy1 hxxps://github[.]com/moonshon hxxps://github[.]com/msdon1211 hxxps://github[.]com/max1t7 hxxps://github[.]com/leojack1211 hxxps://github[.]com/naomibrown178

Payloads mentioned in the blogpost

cda1504b1d4004c8bf3b90b9035ebeb8 46832d82bc25c7363f32b3473872936e97cfe990 4d18cd22365f3f3d714fca4a674014fc7a68d6029da4c53a94fe950189f9c956 (Raccoon) 6a8fddac3de8f8b18c3789d7455a506f af822992f28e35504d8185fa558094e297a749ee 8c5d344c77678fee2bf370d77313cd82a72442c4128ddfe9b4e32333e60116cd (Vidar) cda1504b1d4004c8bf3b90b9035ebeb8 46832d82bc25c7363f32b3473872936e97cfe990 4d18cd22365f3f3d714fca4a674014fc7a68d6029da4c53a94fe950189f9c956 (Raccoon) 963011155b7b84c8850878c68b99445a f5f6cdfd1d12df787cf358e0e5eae8483ab6d06e ed9194aab02f28532a292a55883d17d4c6d9e1398b417c89c49274ef394730c1 (Vidar) c0d7637078d5dfa01af93ab2dda9b426 c092990822a34d403bbbc0a640a2672e7d3e17d f77cf1211c5fbbac802da6f3acfabfcd83a94e8e0fef6f50f925ddcc7bee412db (Raccoon) bf6b5f2d76fb058e3e6a38cbdbdd22a5 dfef116bd3994f05476040608d63fd8af19d09d7 b2f86cda9f22b4adc43c5bb08dfc2625619ab487c5f172b35ce190ac6d8782a9 (Raccoon)

More IoCs are available in the commercial CTI feed of SEKOIA.IO.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Tactic	Technique
Resource Development	T1583.001 – Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
Resource Development	T1583.004 – Acquire Infrastructure: Server
Resource Development	T1588.001 – Obtain Capabilities: Malware
Resource Development	T1588.002 – Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Resource Development	T1608.006 – Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
Execution	T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File
Defense Evasion	T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion	T1036 – Masquerading
Defense Evasion	T1497.003 – Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion
Defense Evasion	T1562.001 – Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Defense Evasion	T1622 – Debugger Evasion
Command and Control	T1102 – Web Service

Read other blogpost :

• Traffers: a deep dive into the information stealer ecosystem
• MSDT abused to achieve RCE on Microsoft Office
• Walking on APT31 infrastructure footprints
• Lapsus$: when kiddies play in the big league
• Aurora: a rising stealer flying under the radar
• NOBELIUM’s EnvyScout infection chain goes in the registry, targeting embassies
• The DPRK delicate sound of cyber
• Raspberry Robin’s botnet second life
• Command & Control infrastructures tracked by SEKOIA.IO in 2022
• Stealc: a copycat of Vidar and Raccoon infostealers gaining in popularity – Part 2
• Bluenoroff’s RustBucket campaign.

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